A utilitarian argues for progressive taxation: 'Taking $10,000 from a millionaire reduces their welfare far less than it increases the welfare of someone in poverty receiving that money, so the transfer increases aggregate welfare.' What economic concept supports this argument?
AThe law of supply and demand — prices adjust to allocate resources efficiently
BDiminishing marginal utility — additional resources produce less additional welfare as total resources increase, so redistribution from rich to poor increases the aggregate
CThe Pareto principle — any transfer that makes someone better off without harming others is welfare-improving
DPerfect equality — utilitarianism requires equal distribution of all resources
Diminishing marginal utility is the key: the more wealth you have, the less additional welfare any increment produces. The welfare loss to the millionaire is smaller than the welfare gain to someone in poverty, so redistribution increases the aggregate. Crucially, this argument requires no appeal to fairness or desert — it is a purely consequentialist calculation. The Pareto principle (option C) does not support this inference since the transfer harms the millionaire.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A government proposes punishing an innocent person to prevent riots that would harm thousands. A utilitarian critic argues this would be wrong. Which utilitarian framework provides the most principled response?
AAct utilitarianism — since punishing one person produces better aggregate outcomes, it is justified
BRule utilitarianism — a rule permitting punishment of innocents would destroy trust in justice institutions, producing worse aggregate outcomes than a rule reliably protecting the innocent
CPreference utilitarianism — the innocent person's preference not to be punished automatically outweighs all other preferences
DUtilitarianism simply endorses this action since aggregate benefit to the many outweighs harm to the one
Rule utilitarianism evaluates the rule, not the individual act. A rule permitting punishment of innocents when aggregate calculations favor it would, if generally adopted, destroy the social trust and legal predictability that cooperation requires — producing far worse outcomes than a rule reliably protecting innocents. This is how rule utilitarianism converges with rights-protecting institutions: rights are worth protecting because rules protecting them work better overall.
Question 3 True / False
Utilitarian political theory holds that individual rights can seldom be violated, since respecting rights usually maximizes aggregate welfare.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is the standard objection to utilitarian politics: act utilitarianism in principle permits rights violations when the aggregate benefit is sufficiently large. If torturing one person would prevent great suffering for many, the calculation could favor the torture. Rule utilitarianism offers a more rights-protective response, but even it grounds rights in their aggregate-welfare consequences, not in their categorical inviolability. Utilitarianism does not categorically prohibit rights violations.
Question 4 True / False
Rule utilitarianism can justify rights-protecting institutions through consequentialist reasoning, while maintaining a utilitarian foundation.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is the key move of rule utilitarianism: a rule reliably protecting individual rights generally produces better aggregate outcomes than a rule permitting case-by-case violations — because rights protection generates trust, stability, and social cooperation that exception-permitting rules undermine. Rights are justified on consequentialist grounds ('protecting rights works better') rather than as pre-political entitlements, allowing rule utilitarianism to converge with deontological institutions without abandoning consequentialism.
Question 5 Short Answer
How does the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism affect the standard objection that utilitarian politics justifies rights violations?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Act utilitarianism evaluates each action by its individual consequences, which in principle permits rights violations whenever the aggregate benefit is large enough — this is where the objection lands hardest. Rule utilitarianism evaluates rules by the outcomes they produce when generally followed, and argues that rights-protecting rules generate better aggregate outcomes (through trust, stability, and cooperation) than rules allowing case-by-case violations. Rule utilitarianism converges with rights protection at the institutional level, substantially deflecting the objection, while maintaining the consequentialist justification.
The objection remains strongest against act utilitarianism. Rawls's critique — that utilitarianism 'does not take seriously the distinction between persons' — applies with full force to act utilitarianism and with reduced but residual force to rule utilitarianism, since even rule utilitarianism justifies rights on aggregate grounds rather than treating persons as ends in themselves.