You decide to use the sign 'S' to record whenever you have a particular inner sensation. Later, you feel something and write 'S' — but you're unsure if it's the same sensation as before. According to Wittgenstein's argument, what is the deeper problem here?
AYou haven't defined 'S' precisely enough — a better definition would resolve the uncertainty
BMemory is unreliable, but keeping a diary or asking others would establish correctness
CThere is no independent standard to check your usage against — whatever seems correct to you is correct, which means correctness has no content
DPrivate language works for clear, distinct sensations but fails for subtle ones
The problem isn't just unreliable memory — it's that there is no independent check at all. Consulting a diary only records what previously seemed right; asking others only works if 'S' has public criteria. For a purely private sensation, the memory itself is the only standard, which means there's no real distinction between 'correct application' and 'application that feels correct.' Without the possibility of error, there is no genuine rule-following, and therefore no genuine meaning.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
In Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box thought experiment, everyone has a box containing what they call a 'beetle,' but no one can see anyone else's. What is the key philosophical point?
ALanguage is inadequate to describe private experiences because words are always public
BThe word 'beetle' gets its meaning from public use, not from the private contents of any box — the private object 'cancels out'
CWe can only know our own beetle, making all communication about inner states fundamentally uncertain
DMental concepts are defined ostensively by pointing to the private object they name
The beetle-in-a-box shows that even if contents vary, or if boxes are empty, it makes no difference to the use of 'beetle' in the language. The word's meaning is constituted by the public practice of using it — not by the private item supposedly referred to. Applied to sensation words: 'pain' means what it does because of public criteria (behavior, circumstances, responses), not because it names a private datum. Option C describes skepticism about others' minds; option D describes exactly the view the argument attacks.
Question 3 True / False
Wittgenstein's private language argument is a claim about meaning and semantics, not a denial that people have inner experiences like pain or sensation.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This distinction is critical and often missed. Wittgenstein explicitly does not deny that you experience sensations. The point is about what gives words their meaning: not private inner states, but public criteria and practices. 'I'm in pain' means what it does because of the surrounding language game — the behavioral expressions, social responses, and circumstances — not because you successfully pointed inward at a private datum. The argument is semantic, not phenomenological.
Question 4 True / False
A private language user could verify correct word use by carefully attending to the sensation and comparing it to their memory of the original sensation.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is the move Wittgenstein anticipates and rejects. Memory of a previous sensation is not an independent standard of correctness — it is just another impression, equally private and unverifiable. You're comparing one impression to another impression, with no external check on whether either matches the original. As Wittgenstein puts it: 'Whatever seems right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about right.' A real standard of correctness must be checkable from outside the subject.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why can't a private sensation serve as the standard of correctness for a word, according to Wittgenstein's argument?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: A standard of correctness must be independent of what currently seems correct — otherwise there's no real difference between 'I used the word correctly' and 'I used the word in a way that feels right to me.' A private sensation can only be checked against memory of that sensation, which is itself another private impression. Without an independent check, the very concept of correct vs. incorrect application collapses. Genuine rule-following requires criteria that are in principle checkable from outside the subject.
This is what Wittgenstein means when he says 'whatever seems right to me is right' — he's making the point by reductio: if there's no independent check, then 'right' loses its meaning entirely. The correctness that genuine language requires isn't just 'feels consistent to me' but 'can be assessed against public criteria.' This is why the argument concludes that meaning is necessarily public: not as a sociological fact about how languages developed, but as a conceptual requirement for what meaning is.