Questions: The Growing Block Theory of Time

Question 1

According to growing block theory, which of the following correctly describes the ontological status of future events?

• A. Future events exist but are causally inaccessible from the present
• B. Future events exist in a probabilistic or indeterminate form until actualized
• C. Future events do not exist at all — only the past and present are real
• D. Future events exist in the same sense as present events, but lack the subjective 'nowness' felt from within

Answer: (C)

Growing block theory holds that the past and present are real, but the future does not yet exist at all. This is one of its key departures from eternalism (the block universe), which treats past, present, and future as equally real. Options A and B confuse growing block with views that posit future events as real but epistemically inaccessible or indeterminate. Option D is closer to the eternalist position.

Question 2

The growing block theory faces a serious epistemic problem. Which best describes what that problem is?

• A. The theory makes predictions inconsistent with special relativity's treatment of simultaneity
• B. You cannot be certain, based on your experience alone, that you are located at the present edge rather than in the already-fixed past
• C. The theory cannot explain why time appears to flow in one direction rather than both
• D. Past events become increasingly uncertain as the block grows, undermining historical knowledge

Answer: (B)

The epistemic problem: a past entity — someone already in the fixed portion of the block — would have experiences indistinguishable from someone at the present edge. All your evidence (memories, perceptions, the felt sense of 'now') would look exactly the same either way. So you cannot be warranted by experience alone in believing you are at the metaphysically special present frontier. This is different from logical inconsistency; the theory is coherent but struggles to explain why you are justified in believing you are at the edge.

Question 3

Growing block theory agrees with eternalism that the past is permanently real and fixed, but disagrees with eternalism by holding that the future is not yet real.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is precisely the 'hybrid' character of growing block theory. It takes the eternalist insight that past events are ontologically permanent — the Battle of Hastings is as real as the present — but rejects the eternalist symmetry between past and future. Future events are not laid out waiting to be reached; they genuinely don't exist yet. This is also what allows the theory to preserve 'genuine temporal passage' in a way eternalism cannot: the block literally grows.

Question 4

In growing block theory, the present moment is metaphysically no more special than any other time — it just feels special from a first-person perspective.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This describes the *eternalist* position, not growing block theory. In growing block theory, the present is metaphysically special: it is the objective edge of the block, the frontier where new events are being added to reality. The challenge for growing block theory is not that the present isn't special, but that you cannot easily verify from the inside that you are *at* that edge rather than already in the fixed past.

Question 5

How does growing block theory improve on eternalism with respect to the intuition of genuine temporal passage, and what new philosophical problem does this improvement introduce?

Model answer: Eternalism treats all times as equally real and fixed — nothing genuinely happens, the future already exists. Growing block preserves the intuition that reality is actively becoming: new events are added to the permanent structure, so the present is a genuine creative frontier. The new problem is epistemic: if past entities are equally real and have experiences identical to present ones, you cannot verify from first-person evidence alone that you are at the growing edge rather than already in the fixed past.

The improvement is ontological — growing block gives time an objective direction and makes 'now' a real metaphysical category, not just a perspectival label. But the improvement comes at the cost of the epistemic problem: all your evidence underdetermines your location in the block. A growing block that stopped growing at your birth would be experientially indistinguishable from one still growing. This is sometimes called the 'epistemic objection' to growing block theory and remains a central unresolved debate.