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Higher-order theories propose that a mental state is conscious when it is the object of a suitable higher-order representation — roughly, when you are aware of being in that state. Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory, developed by David Rosenthal, holds that a mental state becomes conscious when accompanied by an assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that state. Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theory, associated with William Lycan, holds that an inner perceptual mechanism monitors first-order mental states, making them conscious through quasi-perceptual awareness. Both accounts explain why unconscious mental states exist (they lack the relevant higher-order representation) and why consciousness seems intimately connected to self-awareness. Critics object that these theories face a dilemma: if the higher-order state is itself unconscious, how does it generate consciousness? And if it must be conscious, an infinite regress threatens.
Distinguish HOT from HOP carefully — the former is thought-like and conceptual, the latter is perception-like and non-conceptual. Then examine the 'targetless HOT' objection: what happens when you have a higher-order thought about a mental state that does not exist? Rosenthal accepts this creates an experience without a corresponding first-order state. Read Rosenthal's 'Two Concepts of Consciousness' and Lycan's 'Consciousness and Experience.'
Start with the puzzle higher-order theories are designed to solve. You already know the distinction between phenomenal consciousness (the "what it's like" quality of experience) and access consciousness (information being globally available for reasoning and report). Higher-order theories focus on a different question: what makes a first-order mental state — say, a pain or a visual impression — a *conscious* state rather than an unconscious one? The bold claim is that what makes the difference is not some intrinsic property of the state itself, but the presence of a *second* mental state directed at the first one.
Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory, developed by David Rosenthal, gives the clearest formulation: a mental state M is conscious if and only if you have a concurrent higher-order thought to the effect that you are in M. The HOT need not be explicit or deliberate — it is typically an automatic, non-inferential thought that simply accompanies the first-order state. Think of the difference between noticing a background hum you've been hearing for minutes versus the moment it first registers in attention: HOT theory says the hum became conscious when a thought-like representation of it arose, not when the sound itself changed. Rosenthal's account connects directly to representationalism (your soft prerequisite): just as perceptual states represent the world, the HOT represents one's own mental states, and that self-representation is what consciousness consists in.
Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theory, associated with William Lycan, makes a structurally similar move but replaces thought with perception. Instead of an assertoric belief-like state, HOP posits an inner scanner or perceptual faculty that monitors first-order states the way outer perception monitors the environment. This makes the higher-order state non-conceptual — more like noticing than judging — and avoids the requirement that conscious creatures must possess the conceptual repertoire to form thoughts about their own mental states. Animals and infants, Lycan argues, are plausible conscious beings who may lack the conceptual sophistication HOT requires; HOP accommodates them.
Both theories share a common structure — and a common vulnerability. The targetless HOT objection asks: what happens when you have a higher-order thought that *misrepresents* your first-order state, or when there is no corresponding first-order state at all? Rosenthal accepts the consequence: you would have a conscious experience without any underlying first-order state generating it. Critics find this deeply counterintuitive. A sharper challenge is the transitivity objection: if a first-order state becomes conscious by being the object of an unconscious higher-order state, why doesn't the higher-order state's own unconsciousness infect the result? The standard reply is that consciousness is a relational property — what matters is the *relationship* between levels, not that each level is independently conscious. Whether this reply succeeds is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of mind.
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