Kripke argued that proper names do not function like Russell's descriptions or Frege's senses. A name like 'Richard Nixon' is not synonymous with any description because we can coherently imagine Nixon not satisfying that description. Instead, names are directly referential: they refer via a causal-historical chain connecting the name to its bearer through an initial baptism (ostensive or descriptive). A name refers to whoever originated that causal chain, regardless of what descriptive information speakers associate with the name.
Trace the causal history of a name from its origin through a community. Contrast with descriptive theories by constructing counterfactuals: suppose Nixon had lost the election; what does 'Nixon' refer to? The answer reveals what determines reference.
Kripke said speakers need not know what they're referring to—they don't need the correct description or history, but the name must be grounded in community practice. Causal history is metaphysically mysterious—Kripke was proposing an empirical hypothesis about naming conventions.
From Frege, you know that names have both sense (the descriptive content or "mode of presentation") and reference (the object picked out). From Russell, you know about definite descriptions — expressions like "the first person to walk on the moon" that refer via uniquely satisfying a description. Russell argued that ordinary names, on analysis, function as abbreviated definite descriptions: "Aristotle" means something like "the teacher of Alexander who studied under Plato." On this view, what a name refers to is determined by the descriptions speakers associate with it.
Kripke's attack on the description theory begins with modal intuitions. Consider: could Aristotle have not been the teacher of Alexander? Intuitively, yes — history could have gone differently, and Aristotle might have become a farmer or died young. But if "Aristotle" just means "the teacher of Alexander," then "Aristotle was not the teacher of Alexander" would mean "the teacher of Alexander was not the teacher of Alexander" — a contradiction. Since it is not a contradiction (we can coherently imagine it), "Aristotle" cannot be synonymous with that description. This motivates the concept of a rigid designator: a term that picks out the same individual in every possible world where that individual exists, regardless of what properties they happen to have in that world. Names are rigid designators; descriptions are not — "the teacher of Alexander" picks out whoever satisfies that description in each world, which could vary.
If names don't refer via descriptions, what does fix their reference? Kripke's answer is the causal-historical chain. Reference is grounded in an initial baptism — a founding event in which the name is attached to its bearer, either by direct ostension ("This person is 'Aristotle'") or by descriptive identification ("Let's name the baby born today 'Aristotle'"). From that point, the name propagates through a community of speakers, each using it with the intention to refer to whoever the previous speaker was referring to. When you use "Aristotle" today, you are linked — through a long chain of transmission — to that original baptismal event, and thereby to Aristotle himself, regardless of what descriptions you personally associate with the name.
The practical upshot is striking: reference can come apart from the descriptions a speaker associates with a name. Suppose you believe "Einstein was the man who invented the lightbulb" — that belief is false, but you are still referring to Einstein when you use his name, because your use is connected through a community chain to the correct historical individual. This reflects a linguistic division of labor: ordinary speakers can successfully refer to things they have limited or incorrect beliefs about, as long as their use is properly anchored through the social and historical chain. The implications extend into metaphysics: because names are rigid designators, identity statements involving names ("Hesperus is Phosphorus") are necessarily true if true at all — they are not contingent descriptions of what things happen to be identical. This connection between naming, rigidity, and necessity is the gateway into Kripke's broader work on necessity and the metaphysics of essence.
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