The evolutionary debunking argument (Street, Joyce) challenges moral realism by arguing that our moral intuitions are unreliable guides to moral truth. What is the strongest response that defenders of moral knowledge offer?
AMoral intuitions are infallible because they are hardwired by millions of years of evolution
BEvolutionary origins do not automatically debunk beliefs — by the same logic, mathematical and logical intuitions would also be debunked, and we are not prepared to abandon mathematics
CEvolution does track moral truth because organisms with correct moral beliefs survived longer
DMoral knowledge does not require reliable intuitions because ethics is a matter of cultural consensus
The symmetry argument is the strongest response: if we should distrust moral intuitions because they evolved for fitness rather than truth, we must equally distrust mathematical and logical intuitions, which also have evolutionary histories. Since we are not prepared to abandon mathematics on these grounds, evolutionary origins alone cannot be sufficient to debunk a belief system. What matters is whether the belief-forming process is reliable, not whether evolution specifically aimed it at truth.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium holds that moral knowledge emerges from which process?
ADeducing all moral principles from a single foundational axiom by pure reason
BIdentifying moral facts through direct perceptual observation of the world
CIterative mutual adjustment between considered judgments, general principles, and background theories until they cohere
DAggregating survey data on what most people find morally intuitive across cultures
Reflective equilibrium is an iterative coherence method, not deduction from axioms. It starts with 'considered judgments' — moral intuitions held with high confidence under favorable conditions — and seeks coherence between these, the principles that systematize them, and the background theories that support those principles. When tension arises, either the principle or the judgment can be revised, depending on relative confidence. Knowledge is the stable coherence achieved through this mutual adjustment.
Question 3 True / False
Moral intuitionism holds that basic moral propositions are self-evident — analogous to logical axioms — not that they are infallible or unrevisable gut feelings.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is the key distinction the misconceptions section emphasizes. Intuitionists like Ross and Audi hold that propositions such as 'gratuitous cruelty is wrong' are grasped directly upon careful reflection, not through inference from prior premises — analogous to how logical axioms are not proven but understood. Crucially, self-evidence does not imply infallibility: a seemingly self-evident proposition can be rejected if compelling argument shows it conflicts with something we are even more confident about.
Question 4 True / False
Widespread moral disagreement across cultures is sufficient to refute the possibility of moral knowledge.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Disagreement is compatible with knowledge — there is ongoing disagreement in science and mathematics, and we do not conclude that scientific or mathematical knowledge is impossible. Moral disagreement shows that moral inquiry is difficult and that we may be in error about some moral beliefs, but it does not establish that no moral truth is accessible. The existence of some disagreement is a datum that any theory of moral knowledge must explain, not an automatic refutation of moral realism.
Question 5 Short Answer
What core challenge do evolutionary debunking arguments pose to moral realism, and why can the realist not simply ignore the evolutionary origins of moral intuitions?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The debunking argument presents a dilemma: either explain why evolution would track mind-independent moral truth (which is hard — evolution is blind to truth and responds only to fitness), or accept that the correlation between our intuitions and moral facts is coincidental (which undermines their evidential value). The realist cannot ignore evolutionary origins because the credibility of moral intuitions as evidence depends on their being reliably connected to moral truth. If they were shaped entirely by fitness with no connection to truth, the realist has no remaining basis for treating intuitions as data about moral reality.
This is why the debate is genuine and live rather than easily dismissed. A moral realist who simply says 'I trust my intuitions' has not answered the debunker's challenge — they have merely restated their prior commitment. The realist must either show that fitness-tracking and truth-tracking can coincide (e.g., because welfare facts are both fitness-relevant and morally real), or argue by symmetry (the same debunking applies to math), or accept a more modest epistemological position. Each response has costs, which is why moral epistemology remains one of the most active areas in metaethics.