Two drivers both run a red light while drunk. One hits a pedestrian who happened to step out; the other passes through safely. According to the moral luck framework, which statement best describes our ordinary moral practices?
AWe correctly judge them identically, since their choices were the same
BWe judge the first driver more harshly, but this is fully justified by the control principle
CWe judge the first driver more harshly despite their choices being identical — this is resultant luck violating the control principle
DWe suspend judgment on both until we can assess their full character
This is the canonical example of resultant luck. In actual practice — in law and in everyday moral judgment — the driver who hits someone faces far graver consequences and moral censure than the driver who doesn't, even though their choices, intentions, and degree of recklessness were identical. The moral luck paradox is that this practice seems to violate the control principle: only what is within our control should affect our moral standing. Both outcomes here were determined by luck, not by anything the drivers controlled.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A person grows up in a community where collaboration with an oppressive regime is normalized and socially coerced. They collaborate. Which type of moral luck is most directly at issue?
AResultant luck — the outcome (collaboration) was bad
BConstitutive luck — their character was shaped by factors they didn't choose
CCircumstantial luck — the situation they faced was not of their choosing
DEpistemic luck — they lacked knowledge about the regime's wrongness
This is circumstantial luck — luck in the situations one faces. The person did not choose the society, historical moment, or social pressures they were born into, yet we judge them for what they did under those unchosen circumstances. Constitutive luck concerns character traits and temperament, not the situations one faces. Nagel uses the Nazi collaborator case explicitly to illustrate circumstantial luck: a person raised in different circumstances might have been a resistance hero.
Question 3 True / False
Nagel concludes that the paradox of moral luck can be resolved by consistently applying the control principle — we simply need to stop judging people for outcomes they didn't control.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Nagel explicitly does not resolve the paradox this way. He finds the tension genuine and irresolvable: we are committed to both the control principle and to practices of judgment that violate it, and he sees no clean philosophical exit. Attempting to fully honor the control principle would require abandoning most of our ordinary practices of moral assessment — not just outlier cases but judgment of character, outcome, and circumstance broadly. Nagel treats this as a deep puzzle about moral agency, not a problem with a tidy solution.
Question 4 True / False
Constitutive luck refers to luck in one's character, temperament, and dispositions — features of the self that were not chosen.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Constitutive luck is exactly this: the luck of being a certain kind of person. We praise the courageous person partly for traits they were born with or shaped by unchosen early experiences; we blame the impulsive person for tendencies they did not select. This is distinct from resultant luck (luck in outcomes) and circumstantial luck (luck in the situations one faces). Constitutive luck poses perhaps the deepest challenge to moral responsibility, since it suggests the very character from which action flows may not be genuinely 'ours.'
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the central paradox of moral luck, and why can't it be simply dissolved by saying 'we should only hold people responsible for what they control'?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The paradox is that we are committed to two incompatible things: the control principle (only what is within our control is morally assessable) and our actual practices of moral judgment (which routinely assess outcomes, circumstances, and character traits we did not control). We cannot simply dissolve it by endorsing the control principle, because doing so consistently would require abandoning most ordinary moral assessment — we would have to stop blaming people for outcomes that turned out badly, for character traits shaped by upbringing, and for choices made under circumstances they didn't choose. That would leave moral judgment nearly empty.
The force of the paradox lies in how deeply both commitments are embedded. The control principle feels like a bedrock of fairness — it's why we don't blame someone for a car accident caused by a sudden medical emergency. But our actual practices show we DO judge the driver who hits the child differently from the one who doesn't, DO hold the collaborator responsible despite their circumstances. Nagel's point is not that we should change our practices but that the tension exposes something unresolved at the heart of our concept of moral responsibility.