Questions: Rawlsian Justice and the Original Position

Question 1

Under Rawls's difference principle, which of the following wage structures is most clearly justified?

• A. Strict income equality across all occupations, since this is what rational people behind the veil would choose to be safe
• B. A surgeon earning ten times a janitor's salary, where the wage differential creates no measurable benefit for the least advantaged group
• C. A CEO earning fifty times a line worker's salary, where the productive incentives generated by that differential demonstrably improve the absolute position of the worst-off group
• D. Any wage structure that arises from voluntary free-market transactions, since freely chosen distributions are inherently just

Answer: (C)

The difference principle permits inequalities only when they make the least advantaged group better off in absolute terms than they would be under equality. Option C satisfies this: the inequality is justified because it produces a benefit that flows to the worst-off. Option B fails: the inequality creates no benefit for the least advantaged, so it cannot be justified. Option A misunderstands Rawls — he does not require strict equality. Option D is Nozick's view, which Rawls explicitly rejects.

Question 2

Why does Rawls reject utilitarianism as a basis for a theory of justice?

• A. Utilitarianism produces too much equality and ignores the incentives needed for economic productivity
• B. Utilitarianism permits sacrificing the fundamental rights and welfare of some individuals for aggregate gains — violating the lexical priority of equal basic liberties
• C. Utilitarianism is too abstract a principle to apply to actual political decisions
• D. Rawls accepts utilitarian welfare maximization but adds a procedural constraint that it must arise from fair processes

Answer: (B)

Rawls's central objection to utilitarianism is that it treats persons as mere vessels for welfare rather than as individuals with inviolable rights. If sacrificing one person's liberty produces greater aggregate welfare, utilitarianism demands the sacrifice. Rawls rejects this: the first principle (equal basic liberties) is lexically prior to any economic considerations and cannot be traded away for welfare gains. The original position is designed precisely to produce principles that no rational person behind the veil would accept if they might be the one sacrificed.

Question 3

The veil of ignorance in Rawls's original position is a historical claim about an actual pre-social state in which people chose principles of justice.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

The veil of ignorance is a hypothetical thought experiment, not a historical claim. Rawls does not think societies actually formed this way. The device is a method for achieving impartiality: by imagining that choosers don't know their own place, talents, race, or conception of the good, we strip away all the biases that normally distort our judgments about fairness. The original position is a philosophical tool for reasoning, not a description of historical events. Confusing it with a historical state of nature conflates Rawls with earlier social contract theorists like Hobbes or Locke.

Question 4

Behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls argues that rational agents would choose strict equality of most social resources, since any inequality risks being the person at the bottom.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This is a common misreading of Rawls. He argues that rational choosers would accept inequality — but only inequality that makes the worst-off position better than it would be under strict equality. The key insight is that if economic inequalities genuinely raise the floor (by creating productive incentives that grow overall wealth), rational self-interested choosers behind the veil should prefer that arrangement to strict equality that leaves everyone lower. They choose the difference principle, not strict equality, because the difference principle maximizes the minimum position.

Question 5

Explain why the difference principle permits inequality rather than requiring strict equality, and what condition that inequality must satisfy.

Model answer: The difference principle permits inequality when inequality makes the absolute position of the least advantaged group better than it would be under equality. The reasoning: behind the veil of ignorance, rational choosers know they might end up at the bottom. Strict equality is safe but potentially suboptimal — if productive incentives created by wage differentials grow the economy and improve even the lowest positions, rational choosers behind the veil should prefer that outcome over the equal-but-lower floor. The condition is that inequality must genuinely benefit the worst-off, not merely overall social welfare. Inequality justified only by gains to the already-advantaged fails this test.

The difference principle is often misread as egalitarian (requiring equality) or as permissive (allowing any inequality). It is neither: it is a conditional permission — inequality is allowed if and only if it benefits the least advantaged. This means most real-world inequalities fail Rawls's standard, since many produce gains concentrated at the top with little or no improvement for the worst-off.