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Hobbes argues that because the state of nature is intolerable, rational agents consent to surrender their natural liberty to an undivided sovereign — a single authority (person or assembly) whose power must be absolute and unchallengeable. The sovereign is not party to the contract and thus cannot violate it; subjects have no right of rebellion except in direct self-defense. Political stability is the supreme good, and divided sovereignty invites civil war. The Leviathan (1651) was written against the backdrop of the English Civil War and is one of the first systematic arguments for strong centralized government.
Read Leviathan Chapters 13–17 and trace the argument from the miseries of the state of nature to the logic of irrevocable consent. Then engage Hobbes's critics: Can legitimate authority really be absolute? Does fear alone justify submission?
From your study of social contract theory, you know the basic template: individuals in some pre-political state agree to submit to political authority in exchange for the benefits of social order. Hobbes's version of this argument is the most uncompromising in the tradition, and understanding why requires taking seriously his description of what life without political authority would actually be like.
Hobbes's state of nature is not a historical claim but a thought experiment: imagine human beings stripped of any political authority. What would result? Hobbes argues it would be a condition of permanent war — not necessarily constant violence, but constant *readiness* for violence, in which no one can rely on agreements being kept, property being respected, or tomorrow being safer than today. In this condition, the famous passage goes, life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The state of nature is unbearable not because humans are especially evil but because rational self-interest under conditions of uncertainty drives everyone toward predatory strategies. Even a peaceful person must pre-emptively strike to prevent being struck first.
The solution is the social contract: individuals agree to surrender their natural liberty — the right to do anything they can to survive — to a sovereign, who will enforce peace. The crucial features of Hobbes's sovereign are what make his version distinctive. First, the sovereign is absolute: subjects have no right to rebel, no right to judge the sovereign's commands unjust (except to save their own lives), no competing authority they can appeal to. Second, the sovereign is not party to the contract: the contract is among the subjects, who agree to obey whoever they institute as sovereign. This means the sovereign cannot violate the contract — there is no covenant between sovereign and subject, only among subjects. Third, divided sovereignty is self-defeating: if authority is shared or checked, disputes about who has authority will reproduce the conflict of the state of nature inside the political order itself.
The argument's logic is worth tracing from your social contract foundations. The fear of violent death is the strongest human motivation, and avoiding the state of nature is worth almost any political cost. Any sovereign, however arbitrary or oppressive, is better than no sovereign. The rare exception Hobbes allows — resistance when the sovereign directly threatens your life — is not a general right of rebellion but a natural necessity: you cannot covenant away the right to preserve yourself, because that is the entire point of the contract. This makes Hobbesian sovereignty a striking intellectual position: it is simultaneously a consent-based theory (authority derives from agreement) and an authoritarian one (the agreement binds you absolutely). Whether this combination is coherent, and whether the argument succeeds on its own terms, are the central questions Hobbes's readers have debated ever since.
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