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Philosophical anarchism argues that no state possesses genuine moral authority — that is, no state has the right to coerce and no citizen has a corresponding obligation to obey. Robert Paul Wolff's 'In Defense of Anarchism' presents the core argument: moral autonomy (the duty to think and choose for oneself) is fundamentally incompatible with political authority (the claim that the state's commands create obligations regardless of their content). If autonomy is supreme, then even democratic authority cannot generate a binding duty to obey. This does not necessarily mean anarchists advocate revolution; many philosophical anarchists hold that the state may be practically useful or even unavoidable, while denying it has legitimate authority. The position forces defenders of the state to show exactly where political obligation comes from.
Start with the puzzle: why should anyone obey the law simply because it is the law? Work through the main justifications (consent, fair play, gratitude, natural duty) and see how each falls short according to the anarchist critique. Then read Wolff's autonomy argument and A. John Simmons's development of it. The goal is not to become an anarchist but to understand what a successful theory of political obligation must overcome.
From your study of political authority and legitimacy, you understand the standard liberal project: identify conditions under which state coercion is morally justified, generating genuine obligations for citizens to obey. Most political philosophy treats legitimacy as achievable — the debate is about which conditions (consent, fair play, natural duty) satisfy it. Philosophical anarchism pulls the rug out from under this entire project. Its claim is not that the wrong theory of legitimacy has been advanced, but that no state, however organized, can actually satisfy the conditions for genuine political authority over morally autonomous agents.
Wolff's autonomy argument is the sharpest version. Moral autonomy is the duty to think for yourself — to evaluate the reasons for action independently, take responsibility for your choices, and not simply defer to external command. This is not merely a preference; Wolff treats it as a categorical moral obligation, the foundation of mature moral agency. Political authority, however, requires exactly the opposite relationship: the state's directives create obligations in virtue of being the state's directives, independent of whether the content is judged right by each citizen. Obeying because the state commands it — rather than because you've independently evaluated and endorsed the command — is incompatible with autonomous agency. Since the duty of autonomy is supreme, no political authority can be morally legitimate.
An important distinction clarifies what follows and what doesn't. Philosophical anarchism is a thesis about moral authority, not a political program. A philosophical anarchist can consistently hold that the state is practically necessary — that it prevents far worse outcomes (as the state-of-nature thought experiments showed) — while denying that practical necessity generates moral authority. Compare a mugging: if you give the mugger your wallet because he'll shoot you otherwise, you acted prudently, but the mugger had no right to your wallet and you had no obligation to comply. The philosophical anarchist sees the relationship to the state similarly: compliance may be rational, but it isn't morally obligatory in the robust sense that authority claims. A. John Simmons develops this into what he calls associative obligations skepticism: examining each standard justification — consent (most citizens never explicitly consented), fair play (most citizens don't voluntarily participate in a cooperative scheme), natural duty (depends on the state being sufficiently just, which is empirically doubtful) — and finding that none actually applies to ordinary citizens in ordinary circumstances.
The philosophical value of anarchism lies in raising the bar. By taking the anarchist challenge seriously, defenders of political authority must articulate precisely what generates the special moral relationship between citizen and state — something stronger than the mere fact that the state exists, more determinate than vague appeals to social contract. Why does a law passed by majority vote bind dissenting minorities? Why does territorial birth generate special obligations to a particular state? These questions, pressed by anarchist critique, have generated the most serious work in political obligation theory. Even readers who conclude that political authority can be justified often find that the anarchist challenge has clarified and strengthened their understanding of what that justification must look like.
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