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Contextualism in epistemology argues that the content of 'knowledge' attributions varies with conversational context—standards for knowledge are higher in philosophical contexts than in everyday contexts, or when stakes are high versus low. This explains why we confidently assert knowledge claims in normal circumstances but seem to embrace skepticism in philosophical discussion. Contextualism preserves both our ordinary knowledge claims and the challenges raised by skeptical scenarios.
Examine how knowledge-attributions change with conversational context: high standards in philosophical discussion, lower in everyday conversation. Analyze specific cases and consider whether this explains skeptical intuitions.
You already have a foundation in contextualism in epistemology — the view that what counts as knowledge depends partly on context. Now we go deeper into the semantic mechanism: what exactly changes with context, and how does the variability work? The core claim is that "knows" is a context-sensitive expression whose content — what it actually means — shifts depending on the conversational situation in which it is used.
Consider two conversations. In the first, you're chatting with a friend: "Does Sarah know the bank is open on Saturdays?" Your friend says yes — Sarah checked recently. In the second, a large sum of money is at stake: "Does Sarah *really* know the bank is open?" Suddenly, her recent check might not be enough; she should call to confirm. According to contextualism, the word "knows" doesn't express the same concept in both conversations. In the low-stakes context, "knows" sets a relatively undemanding standard; in the high-stakes context, it sets a more demanding one. Both speakers are using the word correctly — they're just using it in contexts that set different standards.
This is the content-sensitivity thesis: the very *content* of the knowledge claim — what proposition it expresses — varies with context. This distinguishes contextualism from the simpler view that "knows" always means the same thing but that people apply it loosely in ordinary life. On the contextualist view, there is no loose application — in a low-standards context, "Sarah knows the bank is open" is *literally true*; in a high-standards context, it may be *literally false*. The standards built into the context are part of the semantic content of the sentence.
Why does this matter? It offers a solution to a persistent puzzle: the skeptical problem. In a philosophy seminar, when you entertain skeptical hypotheses (you might be a brain in a vat; your memories might be unreliable), you seem forced to say that you don't know much of anything. But in daily life, you know all kinds of things. Contextualism says both intuitions are correct — in different contexts. The skeptic raises the epistemic standards to an extreme level, making ordinary knowledge attributions false in that context. But this doesn't destabilize your ordinary knowledge claims, which are made and evaluated at normal, lower standards. The content of "know" in the seminar is simply different from its content at the breakfast table. Contextualism thus defuses skepticism without having to refute the skeptical arguments directly.
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