Eternalism is the metaphysical view that all times—past, present, and future—are equally real. There is no special present moment; time is like space, with all temporal locations having the same ontological status. This view challenges our intuitive sense of temporal flow.
From your work on temporal becoming, you know the debate between views that treat the present as metaphysically special—where time flows and the future is open—and views that reject this. Eternalism is the most radical rejection: it holds that past, present, and future are all equally real, and that "now" is no more objectively privileged than "here." Just as we don't think our location in space makes things nearby more real than things far away, eternalism says our location in time makes present events no more real than past or future ones. The universe, on this view, is a four-dimensional block—the block universe.
Your study of four-dimensionalism should make this intuitive. If objects persist through time by having temporal parts at each moment—the way a road extends through space by having spatial parts at each location—then every temporal part is equally real. The you of ten years ago is not some ghostly remnant; it is a genuine entity located at a different temporal address. The you of ten years hence already exists, located at a future address. Eternalism takes this seriously: nothing pops in or out of existence as time passes, because "time passing" is itself a feature of our perspective from within the block, not a feature of the block itself.
Temporal logic gives this view formal content. In tense logic, operators like P (it was the case that) and F (it will be the case that) quantify over times just as modal operators quantify over possible worlds. Eternalism corresponds to a semantic framework where all times in the model are equally real domains—no time is metaphysically privileged, and the truth of "dinosaurs exist" at past times is just as much a fact as the truth of "humans exist" at the present time. The contrast is with presentism, which holds that only the present is real, making past and future times either non-existent or merely possible. On the eternalist picture, tensed sentences like "the war is over" are implicitly indexed to a time, not descriptions of an absolutely present state of affairs.
The deepest challenge for eternalism is explaining the phenomenology of temporal passage—why it feels as though time flows, as though we are moving from past through present into future, when on the eternalist picture nothing is actually moving. The block universe is static; change is real, but only as variation along the time dimension, not as an ongoing process of becoming. Eternalists typically respond that our sense of temporal flow is a feature of our psychology, not of time itself: memory of the past, anticipation of the future, and the causal asymmetry between past and future combine to create the experience of flow without requiring any objective flowing. Whether this response is adequate is one of the live questions in the metaphysics of time.
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