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Presentism (Formalized)

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Philosophy of TimeTemporal Becoming+2 morePresentism and Eternalism
time presentism existence temporal-metaphysics

Core Idea

Presentism is the metaphysical theory that only the present moment exists. Past events no longer exist and future events do not yet exist; only present entities are real. This view must explain how we can refer to and reason about past and future events if they don't exist.

Explainer

You already know from philosophy of time and temporal becoming that there is a deep question about what kind of thing time is. One central divide is between the A-series (past, present, future as real, flowing properties) and the B-series (all times equally real, ordered only by earlier-than/later-than). Presentism is the most radical A-theory: it holds that the present is not just privileged but *exclusively real*. Dinosaurs are not somewhere in spacetime waiting to be visited; the Roman Empire is not a distant region of four-dimensional reality. They simply do not exist. Only what is present exists.

This is intuitive at first glance—we are never directly acquainted with the past or future, only with the now. But formalization reveals how demanding the view is. You already know from temporal logic that we can reason about past and future using operators like "It was the case that P" (P) and "It will be the case that P" (FP). These operators quantify over past and future times or events. But if only the present exists, what do these operators *range over*? When you truly assert "Caesar was stabbed in 44 BC," you seem to be talking about something. If that something does not exist, how can your statement be true?

This is the truthmaker problem for presentism. The most developed responses appeal to presently existing abstract objects: propositions, facts, or tensed properties that hold now about what was or will be. On one version, there is a present fact that "Caesar was stabbed in 44 BC"—a tensed fact that exists now but is *about* the past. On another view, the past leaves traces: present causal residues (memories, records, physical effects) that ground truths about what was. Neither solution is universally accepted, which is why presentism generates extensive formal machinery.

The other major challenge is Special Relativity. Relativistic physics appears to abolish absolute simultaneity—what counts as "the present" is frame-dependent, not a single objective slice of the universe. If there is no frame-independent present, there is no unique set of present existents, and presentism seems either incoherent or committed to a preferred reference frame that physics does not provide. Defenders of presentism have pursued three responses: reject the philosophical interpretation of relativity that threatens presentism, posit a metaphysically privileged frame that physics does not detect, or develop a version of presentism compatible with relativistic spacetime. Each option has costs, which is why the debate between presentism and its rival eternalism (all times equally real) remains live and technically sophisticated.

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Prerequisite Chain

Understanding ZeroThe Number ZeroCounting to FiveCounting to 10Counting to 20Counting a Set of Objects Up to 20Cardinality: The Last Number CountedMatching Numerals to QuantitiesSubitizing Small QuantitiesAddition Within 10Number Bonds to 10Addition Within 20Doubles and Near DoublesDoubles Facts Within 10Near Doubles Facts Within 20Mental Math Strategies for AdditionMental Math: Adding and Subtracting TensAddition Within 100Repeated Addition as MultiplicationMultiplication as Equal GroupsMultiplication: ArraysBasic Multiplication Facts (0s, 1s, 2s, 5s, 10s)Multiplication Facts Within 100Division as Equal SharingDivision as Grouping (Measurement Division)Division: Grouping (Repeated Subtraction) ModelDivision: Fair Sharing ModelDivision as Equal SharingDivision as GroupingBasic Division FactsDivision Facts Within 100Multiplication and Division Fact FamiliesRelationship Between Multiplication and DivisionDivision Facts as Inverse of MultiplicationRemainders and Quotients in DivisionDivision Word ProblemsMulti-Step Word ProblemsSolving Multi-Step Word ProblemsMultiplication Word ProblemsDivision Word ProblemsIntroduction to Long DivisionFactors and MultiplesPrime and Composite NumbersEquivalent FractionsRelating Fractions and DecimalsDecimal Place ValueIntegers and the Number LineComparing and Ordering IntegersAbsolute ValueAdding IntegersSubtracting IntegersMultiplying IntegersIntroduction to ExponentsOrder of OperationsInteger Order of OperationsVariable ExpressionsThe Distributive PropertyVariables and Expressions ReviewIntroduction to PolynomialsAdding and Subtracting PolynomialsMultiplying PolynomialsFactorialPermutationsCombinationsCounting Principles: Addition and Multiplication RulesIntroduction to Graph TheoryPropositional Logic FoundationsLogical EquivalencesBoolean AlgebraIntroduction to Propositional LogicIntroduction to Predicate Logic (First-Order Logic)First-Order Logic SyntaxTerms and Atomic Formulas in FOLVariable Binding and ScopeOpen and Closed Formulas in First-Order LogicVariable Substitution and Capture-Avoidance in First-Order LogicQuantifier Instantiation Rules in First-Order Proof SystemsUniversal Quantification: Meaning and ScopeFree Variables and Bound VariablesSubstitution and Instantiation in Predicate LogicTerms and Atomic FormulasFormulas and Well-Formed ExpressionsStructures and InterpretationsModel Interpretation and SatisfactionInterpretation, Truth, and Satisfaction of FormulasLogical Consequence and EntailmentSoundness Theorem and Validity of Proof SystemsDeductive Reasoning and Formal Proof SystemsFirst-Order ResolutionPropositional ResolutionSemantic Tableaux (Propositional)Semantic Tableaux (First-Order)Decidable Fragments of First-Order LogicGödel's Completeness Theorem for First-Order LogicGödel's Incompleteness TheoremsIntroduction to Intuitionistic LogicIntroduction to Modal LogicModal Semantics: Necessity and PossibilityIntensionality and Possible Worlds SemanticsEvent SemanticsAktionsart (Lexical Aspect)Tense and Aspect in Formal SemanticsViewpoint Aspect (Perfective and Imperfective)Formal Semantics of Tense and TimeFormal Semantics of Modality and PossibilityPossible Worlds SemanticsCounterfactual Theory of CausationCausal Order and Temporal OrderTemporal BecomingEternalism (Formalized)Presentism (Formalized)

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