Rawls's theory of justice as fairness rests on two principles chosen from the original position. The First Principle (Equal Liberty) holds that each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with the same for all. The Second Principle (Fair Equality of Opportunity + Difference Principle) holds that social and economic inequalities are just only if they are attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality, and if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. The principles are lexically ordered: equal basic liberties cannot be traded off for economic gains. This framework was the dominant paradigm of liberal political philosophy from 1971 to the present.
Read A Theory of Justice Part I and the later revisions in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Apply the two principles to a real policy question (healthcare, education funding). Then engage Nozick's libertarian critique and Cohen's egalitarian critique.
Your prerequisite study of the original position established Rawls's method: rational agents choosing principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance, stripped of knowledge of their natural talents, social class, and conception of the good. This device is designed to produce principles that are genuinely impartial — no one can rig the rules to favor the position they happen to occupy. The two principles are what Rawls argues would be chosen from that position, and understanding *why* he thinks rational agents would choose them is as important as knowing what the principles say.
The First Principle — equal basic liberties for all — is chosen first and holds lexical priority over everything else. Behind the veil, you don't know whether you'll be in the religious majority or a persecuted minority, whether your speech will be welcome or suppressed. Rational self-interest under uncertainty pushes you toward guaranteeing the broadest equal scheme of basic liberties for everyone: freedom of conscience, political participation, personal liberty, freedom from arbitrary arrest. No trade-off with economic gain is permitted here. A society that sacrifices freedom of speech in exchange for greater economic efficiency is unjust on Rawlsian terms, full stop.
The Second Principle operates within the space the first principle leaves open. It has two parts. Fair equality of opportunity goes beyond simply removing legal barriers (you can't prohibit women from applying to law school). It requires that persons with similar talents and motivation have genuinely equal prospects regardless of their class of origin. The child of a poor family with the same natural ability as the child of a wealthy family should face equivalent chances — which requires substantial investment in education, healthcare, and social support. This is already more demanding than what most contemporary societies provide.
The Difference Principle is Rawls's most distinctive and contested contribution. It holds that inequalities in wealth and income are just only if they maximize the position of the least advantaged group in society. The principle is not maximizing average welfare; it is not demanding equality of outcomes; it is asking that the worst-off be as well-off as they can possibly be. Rawls argues this is what rational agents would choose behind the veil: since you might end up at the bottom, you want to ensure the bottom is as high as possible. An economy where inequality produces incentives that grow the pie in ways that also lift the worst-off floor is permissible; an economy where inequality reflects exploitation that could be reduced without harming anyone is unjust.
Holding the full structure together reveals Rawls's deepest commitment: the distribution of natural talents and social circumstances is morally arbitrary. Being born smart, healthy, and into a wealthy family is not something you earned — it is luck. A just society does not allow the outcome of the natural lottery to determine life prospects. The Difference Principle is the mechanism that ensures the gifted do not simply pocket the returns of their arbitrary advantages but share them in ways that benefit everyone. This puts Rawls in direct conflict with libertarian critics like Nozick (who insists you own your talents and their fruits) and with luck-egalitarian critics like Cohen (who argues Rawls doesn't go far enough in neutralizing natural luck). Your upcoming study of the Difference Principle in detail and the communitarian critique will deepen each side of this debate.
Topics in reflective domains aren't scored by quiz answers. Read, reflect, and mark when you've thought it through.