Social influence operates through two distinct mechanisms: normative influence (conforming to be liked or accepted) and informational influence (conforming when uncertain about reality). Understanding these mechanisms explains why people conform differently depending on situational ambiguity and whether public visibility affects behavior.
Compare Asch's line-judgment experiments (unambiguous stimuli) with Sherif's autokinetic effect studies (ambiguous stimuli) to observe how normative pressure dominates when the right answer is objectively clear, while informational uncertainty drives conformity when reality is genuinely ambiguous.
Students often think all conformity stems from wanting to be liked; they underestimate how much uncertainty about reality drives people to conform, assuming they would rely on others' information only about novel or unfamiliar matters.
From your study of social influence and social norms, you know that people often adjust their behavior to match others'. The key question that Deutsch and Gerard's 1955 framework answers is: *why*? What is the psychological mechanism driving the adjustment? Their answer is that conformity operates through two fundamentally different routes that have different cognitive inputs, different social functions, and different effects on private belief.
Normative influence is driven by the desire to be accepted, liked, and avoid social rejection. You conform because the social cost of deviance is higher than the cost of going along. Asch's famous line-judgment experiments illustrate this clearly. Participants were shown lines of obviously different lengths and asked to identify which matched a standard line — a task with an objectively correct answer anyone can see. When confederates unanimously gave the wrong answer, participants conformed about 37% of the time. Crucially, when participants were allowed to write their answer privately (removing the social visibility of disagreement), conformity dropped dramatically. This is the diagnostic signature of normative influence: it depends on public compliance, not private belief. The person often knows the answer is wrong but gives the socially safe response anyway.
Informational influence is driven by genuine uncertainty about what is true. When you do not know the answer, other people's judgments become evidence about reality. Sherif's autokinetic effect studies illustrate this. Participants were shown a stationary point of light in a completely darkened room — due to the autokinetic illusion, the light appears to move, but there is no objectively correct answer about how far it moves. Individuals developed idiosyncratic estimates, but when put in groups, estimates converged over trials into a shared group norm. And unlike Asch's participants, Sherif's subjects maintained the group norm even when tested privately later — their *private beliefs* had changed. They were not just complying publicly; they were genuinely using others' judgments as evidence.
The two routes have opposite properties along the public/private dimension. Normative influence produces compliance without conversion — you go along publicly while maintaining your private view. Informational influence can produce internalization — you actually update your beliefs because you are uncertain and treat others as information sources. This distinction has significant applied consequences. If you want a behavior to persist when the social audience is removed, normative influence alone will not sustain it — the compliance will disappear as soon as the social cost disappears. Internalized change, driven by informational influence or by connecting the behavior to genuine personal values, is more durable.
The two mechanisms can operate simultaneously, and their relative weight depends on the situation. Ambiguity increases informational influence — when reality is unclear, others' views carry more evidential weight. High stakes for social acceptance increase normative influence — when belonging matters more, the cost of deviance rises. Understanding which mechanism is active tells you a great deal about what kind of change is occurring and how stable it will be. A crowd following a false rumor is showing informational influence; a bystander who gives a wrong answer to avoid standing out is showing normative influence. The behavior looks the same from the outside — both are going along with the group — but the psychology producing it is completely different.